Author: Yacht Source: X, @AttackOnTATAYA

On June 13, SpaceX, known as "the most powerful IPO on the planet," completed its initial public offering (IPO), which unexpectedly became a big test for many crypto IPO subscription platforms. All participating platforms have to face a basic but difficult-to-avoid problem:When the world’s best market at gathering liquidity encounters the world’s scarcest stock quota, who really has the ability to turn funds into shares?

Over the past few years, the crypto market (Crypto) has proven itself to be able to connect stablecoins, wallets, exchanges and global users to the same distribution network. One event can attract funds from different regions in a short period of time. Users do not need to re-understand complex cross-border remittances, nor do they need to adapt to the account system of traditional brokers. In terms of “organizing demand”, encryption platforms are already on the distribution table.

But the result of the SpaceX IPO is that entering the distribution table does not mean entering the placement table. Multiple platforms can receive funds, display subscription pages, and promise to obtain quotas, but they may not be able to control the real supply of stocks in the underwriters and licensed brokerage systems. The front end can be infinitely expanded, but the underlying quota cannot be created through over-raising, slicing or technical packaging.

After a brief explosion of information, according to existing industry media, crypto trading platforms Kraken and Gate finally distributed limited shares to some users, while Binance Wallet, Bybit and Bitget Wallet ended their activities with refunds and different forms of compensation. However, there are still differences in the specific allotment ratio, compensation caliber and upstream relationships.

This unsmooth "Starship Launch" exposed the distance between the imagination of on-chain stock tokenization and the actual allotment capabilities. Now that crypto platforms have brought global capital to the doorstep of IPOs, what is missing to move from distributors of assets to effective participants in scarce shares?

The most crowded IPO, what is really scarce

SpaceX is not a company that gets its valuation based solely on forward stories. Rocket launch and recovery, satellite Internet and long-term accumulated engineering system make it have multiple attributes of a technology company, infrastructure company and aerospace contractor. It also represents not just a listing, but the moment when years of private market value enter public market pricing.

Because of this, the SpaceX IPO has been widely described as a historic capital markets event. There are many figures surrounding the issuance size, company valuation, Musk's wealth and employee shareholdings, and there are still caliber differences between different public materials; but the structural fact that can be confirmed is that market demand far exceeds the quota that can be stably obtained through ordinary retail channels.

Hot IPOs are never a public commodity that "money can buy". After the company is listed, it enters the continuous trading market, and qualified investors can buy when the price allows; however, the issuance shares before listing need to be allocated by underwriters, institutional customers, licensed brokers and retail channels. Public trading solves price discovery, but IPO placement solves how scarce resources enter different accounts.

This is also part of SpaceX’s appeal to the crypto industry. Crypto users do not lack risk appetite or liquidity. What they lack is the identity, channels and stable relationships of the traditional primary market. When exchanges and wallets put SpaceX's new entrance next to stablecoin accounts, it provides not only a new product, but more like a ticket that "crypto funds can also participate in top IPOs."

The problem is that the ticket is first and foremost a channel commitment, not the stock itself. Only when the upstream actually obtains shares, will the underlying assets be available to undertake subsequent tokenization, slicing, on-chain transfers and secondary transactions. The more crowded the asset is, the easier it is for the distance between this ticket and the actual seat to be magnified.

What is scarce is not the stock symbol, but the issue price

On the surface, a group of people who have been discussing decentralized finance for a long time suddenly start competing for the stock of a traditional company, which seems to constitute some kind of narrative regression. But this understanding is too simplistic. Crypto users did not leave the on-chain world because of buying stocks, they just began to require on-chain accounts to be able to carry more types of assets.

The development of stablecoins has changed the entrance to funds. In the past, cross-regional investors entering the U.S. stock market had to deal with multiple frictions such as bank accounts, cross-border remittances, brokerage account opening, settlement time and trading hours. Now, stablecoins can allow purchasing power to first enter a global liquid account system, and then be connected to securities exposure through trading platforms, brokerage application programming interfaces (APIs) or tokenized products.

This type of need is not mysterious. When the crypto market enters a downturn, or some users want to diversify asset risks, they will naturally look for assets with more mature business models and stronger market consensus. The growth of stocks, treasury bonds, money market funds, and other real world asset (RWA) products is essentially the result of crypto accounts beginning to shift from “only holding crypto assets” to “managing multiple assets.”

There is another fundamental difference between SpaceX’s new trading and ordinary stock token transactions. What users compete for is not just the SPCX price symbol that can be purchased at any time after listing, but the possibility of obtaining a limited share during the issuance stage. Whether the allotment is obtained determines whether the user can share the potential benefits between the primary issuance and subsequent market pricing. It also makes it easier for refunds to be understood as "missed opportunities" rather than just an unfilled order.

Therefore, the real meaning of listing U.S. stocks on the chain is not just to exchange stocks for a token symbol. It attempts to redo asset distribution: users still use stablecoins, wallets, and round-the-clock interfaces, but the underlying value comes from price discovery in regulated securities, custodial accounts, and traditional markets. The on-chain provides programmable settlement and global access, while the off-chain provides asset rights, legal registration and corporate actions.

IPO is the most difficult stage of stock tokenization

Stock tokenization is often described as a technical project: putting stocks into an escrow account and then issuing products corresponding to their value on the chain. But the real difficult part is often not "how to mint", but "who is qualified to buy, hold and dispose of the underlying stocks".

Take xStocks as an example. xStocks is a product system that packages the economic exposure of traditional securities into on-chain tokens. Its public documents define related products as tracker certificates provided by independent issuing entities. Instead of becoming direct shareholders of record in the underlying company, users gain economic exposure that tracks the performance of the underlying security. Similarly, Ondo Global Markets, Ondo’s product platform that connects on-chain funds with exposure to traditional securities, uses structured notes that track the total return of the underlying securities. Products can be supported by underlying assets, and custody, verification and guarantee arrangements can also be designed, but these arrangements are still not equivalent to users directly holding stocks in traditional securities accounts.

Comparison of the rights structure of real stocks, tracking warrants, structured notes and price exposure

Two abilities must be distinguished here. The first is the asset conversion ability, which is to package the acquired stocks into products that are divisible, transferable or settleable on the chain; the second is the asset acquisition ability, which is to obtain the real shares that the underwriting chain is willing to deliver when the IPO placement occurs. The former can be continuously optimized through technology and product structure, while the latter relies on licenses, capital, compliance capabilities and long-term established market relationships.

From this perspective, there is a simple constraint in the primary market: scarce assets, undifferentiated access and full distribution are difficult to establish at the same time. If assets are scarce enough and global users are allowed to subscribe indiscriminately, then proportional allocation, priority or lottery will eventually occur; if a channel can guarantee full allocation, it often means that the channel has controlled enough shares in advance, or the asset itself is not scarce.

Blockchain can make the distribution formula public, can make the entry and exit of each fund traceable, and can also automatically perform proportional distribution after the total quota is obtained. But the code cannot require underwriters to deliver more shares. The smart contract can faithfully allocate the "existing ten shares", but it cannot generate another ninety real shares just because there is a demand for one hundred shares on the chain.

So, this stress test does not represent an engineering failure for stock tokenization. What it proves is that once tokenization reaches the IPO stage, technical issues give way to supply issues, which eventually return to the placement structure of traditional finance.

How many tables are there between SpaceX and the user

To understand the risks of crypto innovation, we need to break down the vague word "platform". The subscription button that users see in an application may be connected to completely different entities.

Five-layer responsibility chain from issuer and underwriter to end user

The first is the Issuer and Underwriter’s table. SpaceX determines the offering arrangement, and the underwriting system handles pricing, sales and allocation of shares. This layer determines how many stocks are initially on the market and which institutions and channels are able to gain share.

The second is the table for licensed brokers and placement participants. They can participate in securities transactions, account registration, clearing and custody as regulated entities. Alpaca is a US financial infrastructure service provider that provides securities trading, custody and technology interfaces to financial technology companies. Its securities business is undertaken by corresponding regulated entities, and it also provides infrastructure for wallets and tokenization platforms. What matters is not how fast a certain interface is, but whose account the securities are ultimately recorded in, who clears them, and what rules apply in the event of a dispute.

The third table is the Hosting and Product Distribution table. The issuer usually sets up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to issue tracking certificates, structured notes or other on-chain products based on the underlying securities, and stipulates redemption, transfer, corporate actions and default handling methods. This layer determines whether users get equity, debt securities, derivatives or simply price exposure.

The fourth table is the distribution table for exchanges, wallets and protocols. They have users, stablecoin balances, interfaces, traffic and customer service systems, and can package complex products into an almost frictionless subscription experience. What users see is the same brand, but multiple legal entities may be responsible.

In this link, with each additional layer, the efficiency will not necessarily decrease, but the information gap will increase. Users usually know which platform they have handed over their funds to, but they may not know through whom the platform obtained the quota, who holds the underlying stocks, who issues the tokens, and who ultimately bears the refund obligation.

Therefore, the judgment cannot just stop at “whether there is 1:1 support”. We must continue to ask: whether the underlying asset already exists, who verifies it, who has the right to dispose of it, whether users can redeem it, who represents the holder when the issuer goes bankrupt, and whether the front-end platform assumes sales responsibility or only provides technical access.

Multiple answer sheets, what kind of ending do we need

According to the summary of existing industry media, each platform has roughly handed over three types of answers: limited allocation, refund and bearing the cost of capital occupation, and providing future rights and interests after refund. They cannot be ranked solely by the amount of compensation, because the responsibilities corresponding to different treatments are not the same.

Limited allocation, refund and bear capital cost, future rights provided after refund

Kraken and Gate represent the first category of results: The platform does obtain some share available for distribution, but user demand is much higher than the final quota. Kraken’s activity rules indicate in advance the possibility of full, partial or zero allotment, and unallocated funds will be returned to the available balance; Gate will allocate proportionally to the final limited amount. Both have at least completed the delivery from upstream shares to downstream users, but they also illustrate that even at a higher distribution position, crypto users may still get only a small part.

Binance Wallet and Bybit represent the second type of processing. Both ultimately failed to deliver SpaceX shares to users, returned subscription funds, and borne customer relationship costs in different ways. Binance Wallet uses airdrops of additional tokens; Bybit defines compensation as fund occupation rewards and automatically returns funds. The focus of the evaluation should not be on which of the two "gives more", but on whether the announcement is timely, what rights the compensation is, and whether the platform has completely passed on the upstream failure to the users.

Bitget Wallet is closer to the third path: In addition to refunds, it also provides fee-related processing, on-chain fee vouchers and whitelist qualifications for future tokenized IPOs. This type of solution can reduce some direct friction, but also postpones some compensation to the next event. Future rights and interests are only valuable when the user continues to participate, the next activity actually occurs and the upstream performs the contract, so it cannot be treated in the same way as cash refunds or actual stocks.

These different answers also reveal that crypto IPO subscription is still in its early stages: the product structure, upstream channels and responsibility boundaries adopted by the platform are not consistent, and the handling of failures is naturally difficult to standardize. But one thing is certain, clear and consistent rules protect users more than compensation amounts. No matter which product structure is adopted, the platform needs to set a more mature example in terms of transparency, standardization and front-end responsibility.

Full refund, why still not back to the starting point

Judging from the accounting results, the complete return of principal seems to mean that the transaction did not occur and the user did not suffer any loss. However, a refund will not completely return the user to the state before the subscription. Failure to obtain allotment does not necessarily constitute an investment loss that should be compensated by the platform, but it cannot be simply understood as "the user bears nothing."

The first type of cost is capital tying up. Users locked the stablecoin in the activity in order to subscribe, giving up other income and trading opportunities during this period. Even if the money is ultimately returned the same way it came, the opportunity cost still exists. Bybit calculates additional rewards based on a fixed periodic interest rate, essentially acknowledging that the occupation of funds itself has a cost.

The second category is Transaction Friction. Subscription may involve currency exchange, cross-chain, on-chain handling fees, platform handling fees and bid-ask spreads. If the refund currency, chain or payment method changes, users may also bear additional conversion costs. Whether the platform automatically refunds, handles fees, and requires users to operate again is a better reflection of service quality than the compensation number on a promotional poster.

The third category is strategic risk. Some users may establish hedging positions in advance based on the expectation that "spot goods will be obtained". If the spot does not arrive, the hedging will become a unilateral risk. This kind of loss may not necessarily be the legal responsibility of the platform, but it shows that event rules, quota uncertainty and result announcement time will directly affect user decision-making.

The fourth category is Trust Cost. What users participate in is not a smart contract that they can independently audit, but an agency chain composed of underwriters, brokers, issuers and platforms. When the results are not transparent, the market will naturally have doubts about "where the share went." Even if there is no evidence for this suspicion, the platform needs to dispel it with more adequate information disclosure instead of simply asking users to believe it.

Where the benefits come from and who bears the risks is already very clear here: the benefits of successful allotees come from the re-pricing between the issuance price and the secondary market price; before the stocks are actually delivered, users bear the risks of quota, capital occupation, platform execution and information asymmetry. If the platform obtains traffic, asset accumulation and brand exposure, all failures cannot be explained as upstream problems.

Why should decentralized users still trust centralized institutions

The most ironic thing about this incident is that users who pursue verifiable rules still hand over their funds and results to the promises of a series of centralized institutions when entering the real asset market.

This does not mean that users are hypocritical, nor does it mean that decentralized narratives have failed. Real-world assets have never been purely on-chain systems from the start: real stocks need to be confirmed by corporate and securities laws, need to be recorded by brokers, need to be held by custodians, and need to be enforced by courts in bankruptcy and disputes. As long as the underlying assets exist off-chain, on-chain products will inevitably cooperate with centralized institutions.

The real question is not whether centralized institutions exist, but whether the promises of these institutions can be seen, verified and held accountable. Traditional finance relies on licenses, capital requirements, auditing, information disclosure and judicial systems to build trust; the encryption market is accustomed to using public code, on-chain balances, automatic execution and composable interfaces to reduce trust costs. The two systems are not limited to confrontation; they are more likely to redistribute labor in the field of real-world assets.

If the chain is only responsible for issuing a tradable symbol, and the underlying stocks, quotas and capital flows remain invisible, then the so-called decentralization only occurs at the easiest layer. In turn, if the platform can disclose the upstream entities, quota caps, allocation rules, custody addresses or asset certificates, and write refund conditions into the automatic execution program, then the blockchain will truly enter the chain of responsibility instead of staying at the marketing interface.

What can "code as rules" solve and what can't it solve

"Code is law" emphasizes that public procedures govern the execution process. The SpaceX turmoil reminded the market that what blockchain originally tried to reduce was unverifiable agent commitment. If subscription funds, total demand, final quotas and allocation formulas are all auditable, users at least don’t need to guess whether the platform has temporarily changed the rules.

The code can transparently allocate existing quotas, but cannot create quotas that do not exist upstream

The code can record the time when funds enter, can fix the subscription priority, can automatically allocate proportionally after the total quota is obtained, and can also automatically refund when the quota is zero. It can also publicly prove how much underlying assets the issuer holds, limit unsecured issuance, and write some risk triggering conditions into smart contracts.

But the boundaries of the code are equally clear. It cannot force underwriters to increase IPO quotas, cannot complete securities registrations on its own, and cannot handle dividends, stock splits and corporate actionsin place of a custodian. When the issuer goes bankrupt, custody assets are frozen, or cross-border regulatory conflicts arise, legal contracts, licensed institutions, and judicial enforcement are ultimately still required.

Therefore, the more realistic direction is not to "replace all institutions with code", but to transform institutional commitments into verifiable and accountable interfaces. The underwriting relationship does not have to be fully chained, but the platform can disclose which level it is at; the underlying stocks cannot be created by smart contracts, but the shares obtained can be audited; judicial rights cannot be granted by code, but product terms can tell users more clearly what they own.

This also explains why the competition for U.S. stocks on the chain ultimately does not only occur in the performance and transaction interface of the public chain. The real barrier may come from who can connect licensed securities broker-dealers, custody, clearing, special purpose issuers, on-chain settlement and global distribution into a chain with clear responsibilities.

Can encryption updates be really put on the table

Going back to the title, encryption updates are of course already "on the table". It can gather funds globally, load complex securities products into stable currency accounts, and provide new market entrances for users who were unable to easily use traditional securities firms in the past. This distribution table has taken shape and is likely to continue to grow.

But in the face of scarce IPOs like SpaceX, most crypto platforms have not yet stably entered the placement table. They have demand, but they may not have underwriting relationships; they have users, but they may not control the underlying supply; they can issue or distribute tokens, but they may not be able to ensure that real stocks enter the custody account first.

So what will the next crypto IPO look like? Optimistically, more platforms will have direct access to licensed brokers and reliable allotment channels, and make quotas, funds and user rights auditable. In the neutral case, encryption platforms continue to play the role of global retail distribution layer, accepting that popular IPOs can only be partially allocated, and fully writing this uncertainty into product rules. In pessimistic situations, the platform repeatedly uses popular assets to absorb funds, but always ends up with refunds, alternative tokens and marketing rights, ultimately overdrafting users' trust in the stock track on the entire chain.

So, the real deal is not about accidentally grabbing a small share of stock from an IPO, nor is it about giving higher compensation after the event fails. It means a platform that can consistently answer three questions: where does the stock come from, what does the user actually get, and who is responsible when it fails.

The distribution table determines who sees the opportunity, and the placement table determines who actually has the opportunity. SpaceX has simply made the long-standing distance between the two tables so clear to the crypto market for the first time.