In 1865, HSBC issued the first Hong Kong dollar banknote in Hong Kong. For the next century and a half, the three note-issuing banks used the same logic to maintain the credibility of the Hong Kong dollar: 100% support for issuance with U.S. dollar reserves, making a piece of paper a trustworthy carrier of value. Every Hong Kong dollar note is essentially a stable currency backed by bank credit—it’s just printed on paper. In 2026, the same reserve logic, the same banknote-issuing bank, and the same regulatory framework will be put on the chain.

The global stablecoin market value has exceeded US$300 billion, 99% of which is US dollars. The Hong Kong dollar stablecoin does not need to challenge this pattern, just as the Hong Kong dollar has never tried to replace the US dollar - its position is at the end of the line: the US dollar stablecoin completes the cross-border corridor, and the Hong Kong dollar stablecoin completes local settlement.

Local currency pricing for the local market is a role that Hong Kong has played for 160 years.

1. Hong Kong dollar stable currency, an answer that has not yet begun

1.1 The starting gun has sounded

In 2024, the annual transaction size of stablecoins will exceed that of Visa and Mastercard combined, and the total market value will exceed $300 billion - but in the same year, stablecoins will still account for 1% of global payment traffic, the same as in 2023, and the same as in 2022. The absolute scale exploded, but the relative share remained motionless.

This is not a contradiction, but two sides of the same thing: the technology has been "mature" as early as 2020, but institutions have waited five years to really enter the game -What they are waiting for is not the technology, but the "access permission" given by supervision. In 2025, stablecoin regulatory frameworks in multiple major jurisdictions have been implemented one after another, and the switch that institutions have been waiting for has finally been turned on.

There is a rule that has been proven repeatedly in the payment field: the 3-5 years after regulation keeps up with innovation will determine the market structure in the next few decades. In the 1960s, bank card networks quickly established the market landscape after the regulatory framework was established - Visa and Mastercard have since dominated the payment market for more than sixty years; in the 2010s, mobile payment platforms quickly scaled up after regulation caught up, and their position as the first mover has not been shaken to this day.

Hong Kong’s Stablecoin Ordinance will take effect in August 2025, and the first batch of licenses will be issued in March 2026. A license is the ticket, not the answer. This is the starting gun for the Hong Kong dollar stablecoin, not the finishing line.

1.2 Two Judgments and Five Questions

To say that Hong Kong is suitable for the development of stable currencies cannot just stop at the level of "international financial center" - Singapore, Japan, and the Eurozone are all. What truly gives Hong Kong dollar stablecoins room for differentiation are three structural conditions that are established at the same time:

• The linked exchange rate provides quasi-USD stability, making the Hong Kong dollar stablecoin close to the US dollar in stability;

• Hong Kong handles more than 70% of the world's offshore RMB payments and is the only node with both offshore RMB liquidity and international financial infrastructure;

• Hong Kong’s Multi-Currency Ordinance allows CNH to be used as a reserve asset, which is unique among major regulatory frameworks.

Because of the uniqueness of this position, the Hong Kong dollar stable currency will not become USDC, nor does it need to become USDC. Its opportunity lies in the implementation layer of the sandwich structure - the US dollar stable currency serves as a cross-border corridor, and the Hong Kong dollar stable currency serves as local settlement.

Local currency pricing local market. It's not how big the Hong Kong market is, but how difficult it is to copy Hong Kong's position.

The analysis of this report is based on two judgments:

Judgment 1: The Hong Kong dollar stable currency and the US dollar stable currency are not competitive, but hierarchical. The US dollar stable currency has completed the cross-border corridor, and the Hong Kong dollar stable currency has taken over the last leg - the two are complementary and do not compete.

Judgment 2: The key is not scale, but finding a hierarchical position that cannot be replaced. Compliance is just the ticket, and deep integration of local payment systems is the moat.

Most analysis on the market stops at "who will make the announcement" - Standard Chartered, HSBC, OSL, and the list of entrants has been repeatedly discussed. This report wants to take a step forward: after it is published, in which scenarios can it be truly implemented? Who will get through first? What is the business logic? Focusing on these two judgments, this report develops five questions:

Hong Kong dollar stablecoins do not need to win the entire market. What it needs is to occupy a passage - and the outline of this passage can already be seen.

2. Legislative background - from policy intent to regulatory framework

2.1 The origin of a fast-track legislation

Hong Kong’s Stablecoin Ordinance took less than a year and a half from the first consultation document to its formal entry into force. This is an unusual speed for a jurisdiction where financial legislation typically takes three to five years.

Behind the abnormality are dual pressures: externally, Singapore established a regulatory framework for stablecoins in August 2023, and the EU MiCA's EMT rules will be implemented in June 2024; internally, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority is very clear that once the global digital asset regulatory landscape is finalized, latecomers will pay several times the cost of institutional catch-up. The window left for Hong Kong is not long.

2.2 What, how and whom the regulations govern

Hong Kong legislation is not to restrict stablecoins, but to establish rules for an already functioning market. Before the regulations came into effect, USDT and USDC had been widely circulated in cross-border trade and crypto-asset transactions in Hong Kong without any dedicated regulatory framework - this was a direct trigger for legislation, not a regulatory impulse.

The regulation targets "specified stablecoins" - stablecoins that maintain a stable value with reference to one or more official currencies. Volatile assets such as algorithmic stablecoins and Bitcoin are not included in the scope - reserves must be 100% high-quality liquid assets, and algorithmic models cannot pass this level.

What is more important than "what to take care of" is "who to take care of". Payment stablecoins are naturally circulated across borders, so the regulations have made clear extraterritorial extensions:

• Key design: cross-border extension of Hong Kong dollar jurisdictionIf one of the triggering conditions is met, you must apply for a license from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority: issue specified stable coins within Hong Kong; issue specified stable coins anchored to Hong Kong dollars outside Hong Kong; actively promote specified stable currency activities to the Hong Kong public anywhere.

The regulations also clarify the entry threshold for issuers: the minimum paid-in share capital is HK$25 million, and a local entity must be established in Hong Kong; reserve assets are supported by 100% high-quality liquid assets and must be strictly separated from its own assets; management must pass the "Fit & Proper" review of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Yu Weiwen, President of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, clearly stated that the regulatory standards for stablecoins in terms of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing will be almost in line with those of banks and electronic wallets. The three requirements plus bank-level compliance thresholds directly block most pure on-chain native teams and overseas shell companies. Issuers must have real application scenarios.

2.3 Comparison with the global framework: three different legislative objectives

The uniqueness of the design choices of Hong Kong regulations can only be seen clearly when placed within a global framework. Comparing the four sets of frameworks, the core difference is not in reserve requirements or capital thresholds—these are similar—but in a lower-level issue: what is the trigger point for regulation.

The most worthwhile thing to stop and look at in the table is the "Supervisory Logic" row. The United States anchors issuance behavior, the EU anchors user location, and Singapore anchors issuance location—the three frameworks all ask "where to do it." The trigger point in Hong Kong is the currency itself: as long as it is anchored to the Hong Kong dollar, no matter where the issuer is or where the users are, they must apply for a license from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Hong Kong puts its institutional voice first, while Singapore proactively chooses the narrowest jurisdictional radius to serve as a regional hub—the directions are completely different.

The three frameworks ask "where to do it", and Hong Kong asks "what to anchor".

However, the regulatory framework itself does not create demand, it creates the necessary conditions for the emergence of demand. The real test will come after 2026: the first batch of licenses will be implemented, the first batch of B-side business cases will appear, and whether the Hong Kong dollar stable currency can accumulate real usage inertia in the trade corridor.

In the long term, the significance of this law may go far beyond the Hong Kong dollar itself. If the issue of offshore RMB (CNH) stablecoins becomes real at some point in the future, Hong Kong’s stablecoin system infrastructure will be the most natural prototype: regulatory framework, reserve management system, participation of note-issuing banks, and technology accumulation in the Ensemble sandbox, all of which can be directly reused.

3. Banks are all in - what chess are HSBC, Standard Chartered and BOC Hong Kong playing

3.1 Is Hong Kong an end point or a node

The stablecoin layout of Standard Chartered and HSBC in Hong Kong is not a response to new regulations - it is a global strategy that has long been formed and has found a new landing point. Understanding this is the prerequisite for understanding all the actions of these two banks in Hong Kong.

The two banks’ investment in on-chain finance predates Hong Kong’s Stable Currency Ordinance by at least three to five years. Standard Chartered has built a complete on-chain infrastructure from custody to settlement to stablecoin reserve management through SC Ventures. It will be launched simultaneously in Singapore and Hong Kong in February 2025 - the same set of logic, simultaneous launch in the two markets. HSBC is taking the path of institutional financial tokenization: the cumulative issuance volume of the Orion bond platform exceeds US$3.5 billion, covering sovereign-level customers. Specific products will be expanded later.

Hong Kong’s Stable Coin Ordinance therefore has only one meaning for these two banks: access, not the beginning. A prepared global digital asset strategy finally has a compliant local currency.

This also illustrates the true stance of traditional large banks in the entire stablecoin wave: It is not resistance, but absorption. They have not been disrupted by blockchain, but have used their most difficult-to-replicate advantages—regulatory relationships, institutional trust, and enterprise customer base—to decide whose infrastructure the new track will be built on. The disruption narrative misdirects competition from the start.

3.2 Standard Chartered: Connecting global infrastructure to Hong Kong

Standard Chartered's role in the global stablecoin ecosystem is not only an issuer, but also an infrastructure provider. When this positioning was launched in Hong Kong, it was concretized into Anchorpoint.

This positioning is not a strategy unique to Hong Kong, but a model that Standard Chartered has proven in the global stablecoin ecosystem. In February 2025, Standard Chartered did two things simultaneously: it reached an agreement with StraitsX to provide reserve custody for the Singapore dollar stable currency XSGD; it announced the establishment of the Anchorpoint joint venture and directly applied for an issuance license in Hong Kong. The same day, the same set of logic - to be an issuer, but also to be the banking infrastructure behind the issuer. Standard Chartered is a custodian on Paxos’ USD stablecoin USDG, a custodian on XSGD, and one of the issuers on Anchorpoint. These three roles are not contradictory; they are different positions of the same global layout.

In Hong Kong, Anchorpoint's three-party division of labor covers the complete chain from issuance to scenarios: Standard Chartered provides bank-level compliance and reserve management (Zodia Custody serves as the custody layer), Anchorpoint Group is responsible for Web3 scenario development (more than 570 portfolio projects), and Hong Kong Telecom Tap & Go provides local retail payment distribution portals.

Standard Chartered's real bet in Hong Kong is cross-border payments and financial markets, not local retail. CEO Bill Winters' public statement is "bank-grade infrastructure and global network" - Standard Chartered's presence in more than 50 markets makes it a natural candidate settlement layer for the China-Southeast Asia trade corridor. Anchorpoint issues Hong Kong dollar stablecoins. The most valuable thing is not the local circulation in Hong Kong, but the number of markets in which this stablecoin can be accepted by Standard Chartered's corporate client network.

3.3 HSBC: Tokenized deposits are a long-term bet, stablecoins are an unexpected entry

HSBC does not participate in the regulatory sandbox. While Standard Chartered is deeply involved in sandbox testing through Anchorpoint, HSBC is focusing its blockchain investment on tokenized deposits - TDS online, EnsembleTX inter-bank settlement, and HSBC Orion bond platform.

In March 2026, Bloomberg reported that HSBC was expected to become one of the first approved stablecoin issuers in Hong Kong. This news surprised the industry—not because HSBC was unprepared, but because HSBC had clear strategic reservations about stablecoins internally.

The reservation comes from a structural judgment: tokenized deposits are the digitization of bank liabilities, and funds remain on the balance sheet, which does not weaken the foundation of bank deposits; stablecoins require 100% reserve asset segregation and custody, and withdraw customer funds from the bank deposit system - from the perspective of monetary architecture, this is a replacement for bank deposits, not a supplement. HSBC CEO stated: "Tokenized deposits will not weaken the money multiplier effect in the same way as stablecoins." Citi predicts that annual trading volume of bank tokens may reach $100-140 trillion by 2030, surpassing public stablecoins. This is where HSBC's long-term bet lies.

But this logic encounters a boundary in Hong Kong’s cross-border payment scenario. Tokenized deposits are a closed system, and the claims are directed to HSBC and cannot be circulated outside the HSBC system; stablecoins can be used across platforms and chains. In the China-Southeast Asia trade corridor, companies need settlement tools that are acceptable on multiple platforms, not just fast transfers within HSBC. HSBC’s application for a stablecoin license recognizes this reality. Two legs, a pragmatic choice.

HSBC's infrastructure is already in place: the cumulative issuance volume of the Orion bond platform exceeds US$3.5 billion, TDS covers Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg, and EnsembleTX completed the first inter-bank real-time transfer of HK$3.8 million. The stablecoin license is to add an open circulation layer to this infrastructure, rather than starting from scratch.

3.4 BOCHK: Strategic Depth in Different Dimensions

The strategies of Standard Chartered and HSBC are essentially two multinational banks extending their global on-chain financial layout to Hong Kong. BOCHK's value comes from another dimension - not its global network, but its structural position in Hong Kong's financial system.

BOCHK is one of the three Hong Kong dollar note-issuing banks in Hong Kong. It is also one of the most important clearing banks for offshore renminbi (CNH). Most of the world's CNH cross-border transactions are cleared through it. This clearing bank identity has been running for decades and is extremely difficult to replace. Its value does not come from the global network or technology accumulation, but from its institutional anchor position in the RMB offshore ecosystem. The position itself is an asset, and what products are released is a later matter.

BOCHK's current public actions are almost zero - it has not entered the sandbox, established no joint ventures, and has not released any research reports or white papers. This silence is easier to notice in the context of Standard Chartered and HSBC's public statements. But silence itself does not mean absence. For an institution with a structural position in the offshore RMB ecosystem, it is naturally much more cautious than a purely multinational commercial bank in any action involving RMB-related digitalization.

3.5 Three-party comparison: same starting point, three strategic positions

The three Hong Kong dollar note-issuing banks have the same starting point: decades of experience in issuance of Hong Kong dollar banknotes, and 100% support of Hong Kong dollar issuance with US dollar reserves - this is completely connected to the reserve logic of stable coins at the bottom, and is a basis of regulatory trust that cannot be copied by any other participant. But after the same starting point, the goal levels of the three paths are completely different.

HSBC’s entry has changed the situation. In March 2026, HSBC will change from "indirect layout" to directly applying for a license. It is expected to become the first batch of approved institutions together with Standard Chartered Anchorpoint, and OSL may also be on the list. Standard Chartered and HSBC compete at the product level - Anchorpoint focuses on open circulation and cross-border scenarios, while HSBC's stablecoin relies on tokenized deposit infrastructure and may focus more on institutional treasury. But at the infrastructure level, the two are co-builders: Anchorpoint’s stablecoin may run on the EnsembleTX interoperability layer that HSBC participated in building. BOCHK is still waiting in another dimension.

The three cards correspond to three different levels of strategic directions.

Four or three landing paths

With the license in place and the issuing entity entering the market, the real question is: who will use the Hong Kong dollar stable currency and where will it be used.

A payment from Malaysia to Hong Kong illustrates the position of the Hong Kong dollar stable currency in the sandwich structure. The buyer converts ringgit into US dollar stable currency, and the on-chain transfer arrives in minutes - the cross-border corridor is solved by USDC/USDT, which is the home field of US dollar stable currency. However, after traders obtain the US dollar stable currency, they need to convert it into Hong Kong dollars before they can pay their suppliers in the Greater Bay Area and pay local employees.

This "last step" is not a technical issue, but a structural issue - the Hong Kong dollar is the real standard currency for Hong Kong's trade intermediaries. Behind this is a total annual trade of US$1.35 trillion (Mainland + ASEAN together account for 65%). About US$3.7 billion of goods flow through Hong Kong every day, and every transaction has this "last step".

The first-level cross-border corridor is already occupied by US dollar stablecoins, with the largest volume and deepest liquidity. The position of the Hong Kong dollar stablecoin is on the second level: the local currency prices the local market.

The implementation logic of the three paths is completely different: B-side cross-border trade pain points are clear and users are ready, and it is the most likely scenario to complete commercial verification within one to three years; C-side retail volume has a low upper limit and is more about the accumulation of brand recognition; the financial market (RWA settlement currency) has the largest strategic depth, but the longest infrastructure cycle.

4.1 B-side cross-border trade: the fastest verification, the most real pain points

The "last step" in the introduction, what exactly is the slowness? According to Finextra’s analysis, 90% of high-value B2B payments already reach the beneficiary bank within an hour – the cross-border pipeline itself is not slow. What is slow is the last mile: after the funds arrive at the destination bank, they still have to go through local clearing, compliance checks, and manual reconciliation, which often takes hours or even days.

Stablecoin solves this problem - integrating data and value into a single programmable flow, billing, reconciliation, and automatically triggering payments, all on the chain. The global market is already verifying this path: B2B payments account for approximately 60% of the real payment volume of stablecoins, and 43% of B2B cross-border payments in Southeast Asia have been settled using stablecoins.

Improvements are of magnitude: measured data in the sandbox phase showed that a supplier payment was shortened from 3 days to 8 minutes, and exchange costs dropped by 45%; in cross-border tests with Hong Kong-registered companies, the cost was reduced by nearly 90%. This is not a proof of concept, but a record of real transactions that have been completed.

The Hong Kong dollar has irreplaceable advantages in this scenario: US dollar stable currency:

• Compliance channel: USDT has long been in a gray area for cross-border settlement in the mainland, and the licensed Hong Kong dollar stable currency provides complete KYC/AML audit records - in 2024, a Shenzhen company was fined RMB 8 million by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange for transferring funds under a fictitious trade contract. The compliance price really exists.

• Quasi-dollar stability: Anchored by the linked exchange rate system, Southeast Asian traders accepting Hong Kong dollar settlements are equivalent to accepting U.S. dollars, without the need for hedging. The licensed Hong Kong dollar stablecoin is not just a faster settlement tool, but a set of cross-border payment portals with complete compliance infrastructure - KYC/AML, regulatory filings, and bank-level reserve custody, all built-in.

Once this infrastructure is opened in the China-Southeast Asia corridor, a number of cross-border settlement platforms focusing on Chinese foreign trade companies will handle tens of billions of dollars per month. What they lack is not users, but a stable digital settlement tool that is compliant and accepted by the mainland regulatory system.

But the resistance is real. The legal currency channel is still sufficient for now. There are operational costs for companies to switch to stablecoin settlement, and the inertia will not be broken automatically. The concerns of mainland companies are more specific: There is currently no clear answer to whether the use of licensed Hong Kong dollar stablecoins for cross-border settlement requires additional SAFE filings - the compliance advantage is based on a premise that has not yet been officially confirmed. The recipient is also a variable: Southeast Asian suppliers need to be willing to accept and have the ability to exchange back into local currency, and the infrastructure for deposits and withdrawals is still incomplete in some corridors. There is also an internal contradiction that must be faced squarely: while Standard Chartered is promoting Anchorpoint, it is also collecting fees through traditional cross-border remittances. How this conflict of interest is resolved internally determines how much real resource investment Anchorpoint can receive.

4.2 C-end retail: front desk vs back office, two completely different logics

The first real commercial revenue from Hong Kong dollar stablecoins will not come from the C-side - the previous section has made it clear why. The C-side is a display window, not a commercial verification site. But C-end retail is not one path, but two—different directions, different timelines, and different bottlenecks. Discussing them together is why C-side landing predictions are always unclear.

The first one: front desk path. Users feel that they are using stablecoins - actively download wallets, recharge Hong Kong dollar stablecoins, and scan codes to spend at supported merchants. All current retail scenarios in sandbox testing basically fall into this path. The problem is the rational choice of users: Octopus, FPS, and banking apps already have zero friction—why do users need to take an extra step? The essence of the front-end path is to require users to actively migrate their habits, and Hong Kong is one of the cities with the most complete payment infrastructure in the world. This path requires external catalysts—most likely government-led institutional tools, such as the digitization of consumer vouchers.

Second: Backend path. The most successful stablecoin C-side applications are those where users don’t even realize they are using stablecoins. XSGD may have the clearest implementation case so far: Thai tourists use local currency wallets to pay Grab merchants, and the merchants receive Singapore dollars in real time. PayPal's PYUSD does cross-border settlement for the SpeedySend remittance service in the background. All users perceive is "the money arrives faster." HSBC Gold Token is the Hong Kong version - for users, it means buying gold in the app, with the blockchain behind the scenes. Legal currency at both ends, stable currency in the middle, this is a model that is already in operation.

The background path has several structural constraints, which are real ceilings:

• System integration and ecological coordination. Octopus is a closed proprietary NFC ecosystem. Transforming the existing settlement backend is costly, complex in supervision, and has no commercial motivation (e-CNY recharge will be accessible in February 2025, and the driving force will come from policy rather than the market). A more realistic option is for each issuer to first implement it in the channels it controls: HSBC expands the tokenized asset category of the app, and Anchorpoint uses HKT Tap & Go to create a stablecoin payment backend that is transparent to users. It can happen within 1-2 years, but this brings about the second problem: Standard Chartered’s stable currency needs to be embedded in the HSBC App backend, and HSBC has no incentive to cooperate with its competitors. The true scale of the C-side will not break through the critical point until multiple ecosystems are running simultaneously - this is not a technical issue, but a business coordination issue.

• The upper limit of market size. Stripe data shows that Hong Kong’s total digital payment transaction volume is expected to exceed US$111 billion in 2025, and even if stablecoins account for 1%, it will only account for about US$1.1 billion. HSBC Gold Token has a cumulative transaction volume of more than 1 billion US dollars, and is already the most successful case of C-side tokenized assets in Hong Kong. However, the strategic significance of C-side to issuers is more to "show scenes and build brand awareness", not the main source of income.

4.3 Financial Market: After the compliance channel is opened, there will be no obstacles to funds

Local currency pricing in the local market is not only applicable to trade - in the financial market, the Hong Kong dollar is also the most natural on-chain unit of account for local assets in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's managed assets exceed HK$31 trillion, more than 70% of the world's RMB settlements are completed through Hong Kong, and about 30% of Asia's international bond issuance in 2024 will be facilitated by Hong Kong - these assets and funds are already flowing, and what is missing is not scale, but more efficient on-chain settlement tools.

Major exchanges and clearing institutions around the world are already taking the lead in this direction - the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, and DTCC (which handle over US$2 trillion in securities settlement on average every day) are all testing on-chain settlement infrastructure. The role of Hong Kong dollar stablecoins in Hong Kong follows the same path: not to create new investment products, but as a compliant on-chain settlement channel. Once funds enter the chain through a licensed Hong Kong dollar stablecoin, they are eligible to flow within Hong Kong's compliant financial system - purchasing tokenized bonds, participating in tokenized funds, and settling RWA assets are all within the same compliance framework.

In February 2026, eight departments including the National Development and Reform Commission issued "Document No. 42", establishing the RWA compliance path of Domestic assets - overseas issuance - domestic filing. Hong Kong is the natural landing node for this channel. The Hong Kong dollar stablecoin is the front-end settlement currency in this structure - from the issuance of overseas RWA for domestic corporate assets, to tokenized government bonds (the world's largest digital bond will be worth approximately US$1.3 billion in 2025), to tokenized physical assets such as HSBC Gold Token (with a cumulative transaction volume of over US$1 billion), the Hong Kong dollar is the most natural on-chain pricing and settlement unit.

The premise constraints of this scenario are also real: the filing system of Document No. 42 has just begun at the practical level, and the types of RWA other than asset-backed securities tokens have yet to be released. The liquidity of the tokenized secondary market is still a bottleneck - there are not enough buyers and sellers present at the same time, and the efficiency advantage of on-chain settlement cannot be exerted; the pace of regulatory coordination between the Mainland and Hong Kong ultimately determines the actual speed of this scenario. The infrastructure is already in place, but it will take time for the system to work together.

4.4 Three banks, one stable currency, one set of infrastructure

Standard Chartered is competing for global trade fund settlement, and Anchorpoint is the front-end location of this global cross-border settlement layout in Hong Kong; HSBC is building a global financial infrastructure. The two nodes have different access points, but they serve different usage scenarios of the same stable currency.

The entry nodes are different, but they share the same set of on-chain infrastructure; competition is at the product layer, and collaboration is at the settlement layer. For Hong Kong dollar stablecoins, the three paths have an inherent accumulation sequence: the B side goes first, trading companies exporting from the backend use stablecoins for payment settlement, and the front store completes transactions; funds remain in Hong Kong in the form of Hong Kong dollar stablecoins, forming a deposit in Hong Kong and bringing about compliant fund settlements; the precipitated liquidity supports the depth of RWA settlement in the financial market; with the accumulation of compliance endorsements, the C-side backend path naturally penetrates.

Hong Kong dollar stablecoin does not need to win in three ways at the same time. First build a real use case on the B-side that no one can deny - the rest will follow.

5. Global Reference System - Survival Sample of Small Currency Stablecoins

The stablecoin market is highly concentrated. In this situation, The survival proposition of small-currency stablecoins is not "how to compete with U.S. dollar stablecoins", but "finding a real position in places that U.S. dollar stablecoins cannot cover."

The next four cases - UAE, XSGD, EURC, BRLA - all verify the two judgments made in the first chapter: none of the surviving small-currency stablecoins relies on head-on competition with the US dollar.它们都找到了一个美元稳定币不愿意做、做不好、或者不被允许做的位置，然后在那个位置上建立不可替代性。

5.1 UAE：分层并存的完整样本

UAE 是目前全球最完整呈现"同一监管框架下，机构层和零售层并存"的案例。两个迪拉姆稳定币，两家不同发行方，两种截然不同的定位，在同一套央行监管下共存——这是两个判断的综合验证。 UAE 的价值在于展示生态分层：一个市场里两种稳定币如何共存；后面的 XSGD 则展示执行路径：单一稳定币如何从零走到规模。两者维度不同，不重叠。

AE Coin：零售层，日常消费场景。 Al Maryah Community Bank 发行，2024 年 12 月获 UAE 央行全面许可，是 UAE 第一个持牌零售迪拉姆稳定币。落地速度超出预期：2025 年 12 月与 ADNOC Distribution 签约，覆盖 UAE、沙特、埃及近 980 个加油站及 Oasis 便利店；2025 年 10 月迪拜政府财政部门开始试点接受 AE Coin 支付政府服务费；随后延伸至阿布扎比出租车和航班订票场景。 Chainalysis 数据显示，UAE 93%的稳定币转账是零售规模，印证了 AE Coin 的核心定位。用户在加油站付款，感知不到稳定币的存在——前端不变，后端换成链上，这是第四章后台路径的现实版本。反面教材是巴西 cREAL：依赖激励做量，激励收缩后跌幅超 90%——场景是护城河，激励不是。

DDSC：机构层，高价值结算与贸易供应链。 IHC（阿布扎比多元化控股，资产超 500 亿美元）联合 First Abu Dhabi Bank 发行，2026 年 2 月获 UAE 央行批准上线。定位完全是机构端：高价值支付与结算、treasury 管理、贸易供应链流转。路线图不止于 UAE——先从迪拉姆开始，扩展到 GCC 其他货币，再通过 M-Pesa 基础设施连接非洲，目标是构建 MENA-非洲-亚洲的合规区域结算网络。

UAE 监管还有一个关键设计：PTSR 过渡期于 2025 年 7 月结束后，商户在 UAE 只能接受央行批准的迪拉姆稳定币用于日常支付；外国稳定币（USDT、USDC）只能用于虚拟资产交易生态，不得用于商户收款。本地稳定币保护支付主权，外国稳定币限于资本市场——判断一（分层不竞争）在 UAE 成为了制度设计，不只是市场现象。

5.2 XSGD：跨境结算层的先行者

UAE 展示的是一个市场里的生态分层，XSGD 展示的是另一个维度：单一小币种稳定币从监管落地到规模化的完整执行路径。 StraitsX 持有新加坡 MAS 颁发的主要支付机构牌照，XSGD 目前运行在以太坊、Polygon、Avalanche、Arbitrum、Zilliqa、Hedera、XRPL 七条链上，储备托管由渣打银行和 DBS 银行担任，StraitsX 旗下稳定币（XSGD+XUSD）合计累计链上交易量超过 180 亿美元。

XSGD 的场景覆盖比通常认知更宽：与 Alipay+和 Grab 合作的跨境零售 FX（泰国游客在新加坡扫码付款，XSGD 在后台做实时 FX 结算，商户收到新加坡元）；机构级 B2B 跨境支付和 treasury 结算，通过 API 整合 Singapore FAST、PayNow 和 SWIFT 三套轨道；已于 2026 年初上线 Solana，目标是 on-chain FX 和机构跨境结算，SGD/USD 在同一条链上实时兑换，无需传统中间行。这已经不只是汇款落地，而是在跨境结算层全面布局。

这里有一个比层级差异更深的问题：XSGD 和港元稳定币在服务中国—东南亚走廊这个场景里，有真实的层级重叠——从东南亚买家的视角，两者都是合规的亚洲本地货币结算工具，功能类似。新加坡先跑了两年，在这条走廊上已有用户认知积累。但港元稳定币有两个 XSGD 不具备的差异化：监管跨境效力（锚定港元即须持牌，不论发行地）和离岸人民币连接的潜力。

渣打银行同时是 XSGD 和 Anchorpoint 的储备托管方——不是利益冲突，而是全球性银行的双节点布局：新加坡节点服务东南亚汇款和零售 FX，香港节点服务中国—东南亚贸易结算。 XSGD 的发展轨迹是港元稳定币最直接的执行参照：从监管落地到多链部署，从机构 B2B 到零售 FX——这条路港元稳定币也要走，但现在已经落后了两年。

还有一个更大的视角值得在这里点出：如果 JPYC（日元）、XSGD（新加坡元）、港元稳定币同时部署在同一条公链上，东北亚—东南亚的多货币结算走廊就有了雏形——三种亚洲本地货币稳定币直接互换，无需经过美元中间层。 这个场景不需要任何一方替代美元，只需要三个合规稳定币共存于同一个链上生态。门槛比想象中低，时间线比想象中近。

5.3 EURC：合规是加速器，不是门槛

EURC（欧元，Circle 发行）是目前全球体量最大的非美元小币种稳定币，核心场景在机构层：EURC/USDC 是 DeFi 主流 FX 交易对，Aave、Morpho 等协议将其用于借贷抵押，企业用它做欧元区内的薪资和供应商结算。

EURC 最有价值的数据点是时间线对比：MiCA 于 2024 年 6 月落地之前，欧元稳定币整体市值萎缩了 48%，机构普遍观望；MiCA 落地后 12 个月，市值翻倍，月交易量从 3.83 亿美元跳升近九倍，EURC 自身交易量增幅达 1,139%。 EURC 市占率从 17%升至 42%，到 2026 年 3 月进一步突破 50%、市值超 4.5 亿美元，成为欧元稳定币的主导者——Circle 在 MiCA 生效前已在法国获得电子货币机构授权，是合规准备最充分的发行方，非合规稳定币被主流交易所下架后，EURC 承接了大量流量。同期 58%的欧洲机构已在使用或计划将稳定币纳入支付流程。

但 East Asia Forum 的分析也直接点出了这个命题的另一面：尽管有法律清晰度，欧元稳定币仍未能在流动性和网络效应上挑战美元稳定币——合规打开的是门，门里面还需要找到具体的、不可替代的位置。 EURC 找到的位置是欧元区贸易结算，不和美元稳定币正面竞争。 "合规落地→机构涌入"这个传导机制是通用的：香港《稳定币条例》在 2025 年 8 月落地，对港元稳定币 B 端路径能产生类似的催化效应。

这个传导机制不止于 B 端走廊：EURC 在 Aave、Morpho 上的借贷抵押角色，就是第四章 RWA 场景的欧元版本——合规不只打开贸易通道的门，也是接入链上金融市场的通行证。

5.4 BRLA：非主要货币的B2B突破

BRLA 是四个案例里对港元稳定币 B2B 路径参考意义最直接的：非主要储备货币、没有天然全球需求、靠合规性和本地支付系统集成建立护城河。 BRLA Digital 发行的巴西雷亚尔稳定币，核心是充当"美元进、雷亚尔出"的合规桥梁。 BRLA-USDC 是拉美最大本地货币/美元 DEX 交易对，累计成交约 9,750 万美元；巴西 B2B 稳定币月交易量已从不足 1 亿美元增长到 2025 年超过 30 亿美元，增幅超 30 倍——赛道本身在快速成长。

BRLA 的护城河非常具体：PIX 集成。 PIX 是巴西央行推出的即时支付系统，覆盖几乎所有巴西银行账户，BRLA 通过 PIX 集成把链上美元稳定币和本地金融体系无缝衔接。 PIX 之于 BRLA，转数快之于港元稳定币——本地支付系统的深度集成，是非主要货币稳定币在 B 端建立不可替代性最直接的路径。

挑战也真实存在：规模增长依赖 B2B 客户的重复使用，节奏平缓；2025 年 12 月巴西证券交易所 B3 宣布将发行机构级雷亚尔稳定币，竞争即将升级。对港元稳定币来说，对应的挑战是与内地外管局体系的衔接边界尚未明确。不过巴西生态里有一个值得点出的积极信号：cREAL 和 cKES（肯尼亚先令）在 Celo 链上已形成直接交易对，累计成交约 2,490 万美元——两个本地货币稳定币绕过美元中间层直接互换，这条路已经在走了。

5.5 从案例回到判断：港元稳定币的位置

四个案例，共同指向同一个结论：小币种稳定币的生存不靠和美元正面竞争，靠在三明治模型里找到一个特定的层级位置——合规是入场券，本地支付系统的集成是护城河，场景绑定是用户留存的根本。港元稳定币在这个框架里的独特性，已经在第一章说清楚了。四个案例做的，是把两个判断从概念变成数据。

位置已经可以看见轮廓。接下来的问题是：占住这个位置之后，靠什么赚钱。

六、发行方的商业逻辑——谁控制通道，谁就赚钱

牌照解决的是"能不能做"的问题，不是"靠什么赚钱"的问题。

全球稳定币市场正在经历一个范式迁移，而这个迁移有一个底层逻辑：谁控制资金流动的通道，谁就赚钱。储备利息是起点，通道才是终点。这个逻辑，已经被 Circle 的 IPO 弧线、JPMorgan 的 Kinexys、Visa/Mastercard 的网络策略，以及消费企业的品牌化实验，从四个不同维度验证。

本章从这四个维度出发，最后回到港元稳定币：三级通道，一条演进路径。

6.1 Circle：被逼出来的转型

Circle 的商业模式问题，写在 S-1 里，白纸黑字。 2024 年收入 17 亿美元，向分发合作伙伴支付了 10 亿美元——其中 Coinbase 一家拿走 9 亿。 Circle 每赚 1 美元，近 60 美分交给渠道。这不是战略选择，是结构性出血。

更关键的是收入结构：2024 年收入的 95%-99%来自储备利息，2025 年全年这个比例没有实质改变——Q4 储备收入 7.33 亿美元，其他收入仅 3700 万美元，储备依然占约 95%。 USDC 市值在 2025 年底达约 753 亿美元（同比增长 72%），Q4 链上交易量 11.9 万亿美元（同比增长 247%）——规模在爆发，但变现模式没有跟上。两个死穴随之而来——利率降 100bp，年收入直接减少约 4.41 亿美元；规模扩张依赖渠道，但渠道成本侵蚀了几乎所有利润空间。这个模型在高利率周期极度丰厚，但经不起利率下行，也经不起渠道反噬。

资本市场把这个矛盾定价得很清楚。 IPO 冲至$299 是稀缺性溢价和情绪泡沫，暴跌 78%至$49.90 是按"储备利差机构"打折，随后反弹至$126 是市场第一次开始给转型路径定价——触发点是 Q4 财报超预期（EPS $0.43 vs 预期$0.16）和 CPN 通道规模持续增长（年化交易量 57 亿美元，55 家金融机构入网）。 Circle 2025 年全年收入 27 亿美元（增长 64%），但储备利息仍占绝对主体，通道收入还在早期。方向明确：靠储备利息养不活一家需要按基础设施估值的公司。

6.2 Kinexys：通道费的逻辑没变，轨道换了

JPMorgan 做的不是稳定币，这是理解 Kinexys 的前提。 JPMD（JPM Coin）是代币化银行存款——背靠摩根大通资产负债表，可以付息（GENIUS 法案禁止稳定币付息，但不禁止存款代币付息），机构客户视同银行账户，而不是把资金转移给一个非银行发行方持有的储备池。

Kinexys 自 2019 年起在私有链上为机构客户提供存款账户，已处理超 3 万亿美元代币化交易，日均 50 亿美元以上。商业模式非常清晰：存款关系深化、机构结算通道费、抵押品管理费。这和 SWIFT 时代的逻辑完全一样——JPMorgan 赚的从来不是持有资金的利息，而是资金流动的通道费。区别只是轨道：从 SWIFT/Fedwire 换成了区块链。

Kinexys 和 Circle 的最大区别不在技术，在起点。 Kinexys 产品负责人 Basak Toprak 说得直接：存款代币让资金留在摩根大通的资产负债表上，企业财务主管知道会计处理方式、了解交易对手风险，不需要任何行为改变。 JPMorgan 已有$10 万亿/天的结算量、已有客户关系、已有收费逻辑，上链只是把现有客户迁移到更高效的轨道上；Circle 从零建立分发网络，每扩张一步都要付出渠道成本。同一个区块链，两种完全不同的经济学。

对香港：持有银行牌照的发行方天然更接近 Kinexys 路径。它们不需要从零建立分发网络，只需要把已有的机构客户关系搬上链。 B 端跨境贸易走廊，是这类发行方最快可以验证的通道。

6.3 Visa/Mastercard：稳定币是新的货币，不是新的网络

有一个关于 Visa 和 Mastercard 的根本误读：以为稳定币会颠覆卡组织。这个判断搞错了作用层。

Visa 从来不持有资金，不赚利息——它赚的是每一笔资金流动的通道费。网络本身不在乎流通的是什么货币，它在乎的是那笔交易有没有经过它的路由、清算、争议解决体系。稳定币只是在这张已有网络上流通的一种新货币形态，不是替代这张网络的理由。

Visa 面对一个清晰的战略选择：发行 Visa 品牌稳定币，成为众多航空公司之一；或者把所有稳定币整合进 Visa 网络，成为所有航空公司都必须经过的机场。 Visa 选择了机场。 2025 年 12 月，Visa 正式在美国推出 USDC 结算，基于 Solana 运行，年化结算量已超 35 亿美元——不是在做跨境支付产品，而是把稳定币嵌入自己的核心结算层。无论哪个发行人赢，Visa 都受益。枢纽地位对哪个辐条获胜是不可知的。

Mastercard 走同一条路：不押注哪条链赢，把合规验证和争议解决做成所有稳定币都必须接入的信任层。

对港元稳定币：Visa/Mastercard 的网络是现成的分发基础设施，持牌港元稳定币接入这张网络的门槛，比从零建网络低得多。

6.4 消费企业品牌稳定币：代币只是基础，商业模式才是核心

Western Union、Klarna、索尼银行正在做的事，和 Circle 完全不同——它们不是在发行一个新的稳定币来赚储备收益，而是在把稳定币嵌入自己已有的客户交易流程，用来提升 ARPU、控制交易数据、嵌入自定义激励。 KPI 不是市值，是生态内的单位经济效益。

这个逻辑很清晰：几十年来，企业别无选择，只能使用第三方支付，把利润拱手让给 Visa/Mastercard/支付宝，并且把所有交易数据也让出去。品牌稳定币是第一次让企业可以自己设计货币层——在封闭生态里，这意味着：从客户活动（余额和流量）中获取更多价值，嵌入自定义激励（忠诚度、定向促销），拥有完整的交易数据，以及不受制于第三方的结算路径。

PYUSD 是这条路最清晰的警示——不是失败，而是卡在中间状态的挣扎。 2025 年 7 月 PayPal 宣布 PYUSD 已进入 70 多个市场、和 Fiserv 合作推进全球部署，分发渠道不可谓不宽；但 PYUSD 的核心问题始终没有解决：它是产品的附属品，而不是产品的核心组成部分——用户用 PayPal，不是因为 PYUSD，PYUSD 只是偶尔可用的选项。品牌稳定币成功的前提，不是"有用户"，而是"稳定币是用户核心交易流程里不可绕过的那一层"。有渠道，没有核心场景，是附属品；有渠道，有核心场景，才是护城河。

对香港：这条路目前几乎是空白。中资消费平台因内地政策压力大规模撤出——从 77 个表达兴趣，到 36 个正式申请，再到预计少数几个获批，消费企业的缺位是港元稳定币生态最显著的结构性空白。谁先用品牌稳定币真正控制住一个高频消费场景，谁就建立了 C 端护城河。

6.5 回到港元：三个市场，三种收费逻辑

稳定币打通的是三个巨量市场：支付、借贷、资本市场。每个市场对应不同的收费逻辑，也对应不同的切入门槛。港元稳定币的发行方从哪里切入，取决于自己的起点。

四条路不是递进关系，是单点突破。没有发行方会同时推进四条，而是从自己的优势切入，先建立一个无法被替代的通道，再向其他方向延伸。

B 端走廊是当下最清晰的答案——不需要消费者教育，不需要零售受理网络，只需要两端企业愿意用港元结算。持有银行牌照、已有大湾区贸易客户的发行方，是最有可能先跑通这条路的。港元稳定币面对的约束——低利率、小市场、严监管——不是借口，恰恰是差异化空间：低利率逼着发行方更早走向通道模式，小市场意味着 B 端走廊比 C 端消费更快可以验证，严监管的壁垒意味着谁先建立合规通道、谁的先发优势最难被追赶。 C 端消费和 RWA 借贷，跟着走廊的量来。

港元稳定币需要的是占住一条无法被替代的通道——而这条通道，现在已经可以看见了。

七、结语——港元稳定币的故事，从这里才真正开始

首批牌照即将落地。这是一个起点，不是终点。

接下来两到三年，港元稳定币会在中国—东南亚贸易走廊里找到第一批真实用户，会在香港的 RWA 结算层积累第一批链上流动性，会在某个高频消费场景里完成第一次后台路径的验证。这些不会同时发生，也不需要同时发生——每一个单点突破，都在为下一个铺路。

但真正的转折点不是第一笔交易——是第一家企业决定把运营资金留在港元稳定币里过夜，而不是每笔结算完毕立刻换回法币。当结算变成持有，稳定币就从支付工具变成了财资基础设施。这个转折目前在全球所有非美元稳定币里还没有发生过。 XSGD 没有，EURC 没有，BRLA 也没有——企业用完即走，没有人把本地货币稳定币当作资金停泊的港湾。港元稳定币如果能率先突破这一步，它的经济学会从通道费跃迁到余额管理，估值逻辑彻底改变。

更大的问题留在更远处：离岸人民币稳定币的可能性，人民币国际化在数字时代的演进路径，香港作为全球合规数字金融枢纽的长期定位。这些问题的答案，不在本报告的射程内——但港元稳定币的每一步，都在为这些问题的答案创造条件。

最后一个问题不是"港元稳定币能不能成功"，而是"谁会占住那个位置"。答案正在被写下来。