Author: Eric, Foresight News

On the evening of March 13, Beijing time, UTime, a Nasdaq-listed company, announced that it planned to acquire 100% of the shares of Feixiaohao for a consideration of US$80 million, with payment of US$64 million in UTime common shares or convertible bonds and US$16 million in cash.

Liandai Technology stated that after the completion of this acquisition, the company will obtain all technical platforms, source codes, databases and trademark rights of Feixiaohao. Liandai Technology plans to combine Feixiaohao’s data capabilities with its hardware expertise and explore innovative applications that integrate blockchain data services directly into mobile devices and smart hardware, thereby entering the field of Web3 and blockchain data infrastructure.

成立于 2017 年 8 月的非小号，在经历了近 10 年的岁月之后以被收购作为结局，并不失为一个好消息。 As a domestic market information platform that is as famous as Mytoken in the early stages of blockchain development, Feixiaohao is indeed the memory of many elders in the currency circle. I believe many people are happy to see such a result.

But after digging deeper into this acquisition of nearly 100 million US dollars, the author discovered many doubts behind the transaction.

Doubt 1: Why acquire non-small accounts?

The Chinese name of the non-small-sized acquirer UTime is Liandai Technology. The company is located in the Shenzhen Software Industry Base and is a neighbor of Tencent’s Binhai Building.

Liandai Technology was founded in 2008 and listed on Nasdaq in April 2021. Its core business in the past was simply manufacturing mobile phones. It has two self-branded mobile phones, "UTime" and "Do", and also provides OEM and ODM services for TCL, Haier and other brands. The official website shows that its global cumulative sales of mobile phone terminal products exceed 25 million units.

But starting from 2024, Liandai Technology has begun to transform from traditional mobile phone manufacturing to the medical and health field, getting involved in medical wearable devices. On December 31 last year, the company announced that its Hong Kong subsidiary UTime Technology (HK) Company Limited had formally signed a purchase agreement for smart health equipment worth nearly US$10 million with Denver-based Tumu Vertex LLC, including blood pressure watches and smart rings.

难以理解的是，转型医疗健康领域看似非常成功，却突然又想要进军 Web3 和区块链数据基础设施领域。

If this kind of "whatever comes up is what comes out" is still within the understandable range, then choosing Feixiao is incomprehensible: if you open Feixiao's apps and websites, you will find that Feixiao actually captures almost no "on-chain data", but only aggregates data and information from platforms such as exchanges and media through APIs. Such simple information aggregation is even full of errors.

At the time of writing, the gas fee on Ethereum is 0.6 GWei, but the data on non-small accounts is 9 GWei.

Even putting this aside, the author has never thought of any need to "integrate this data into smart hardware." If you want to view the data, using the App directly seems to be a more direct option.

如果收购非小号这样的应用都花了 8000 万美元，那更为复杂的链上数据抓取，你还准备花多少钱？

Doubt 2: Is the non-small number worth US$80 million?

If you asked this question before 2021, I would still have the confidence to give a positive answer, but at this point in time, the data capture capabilities and information richness of platforms such as Coinglass, CoinAnk, SosoVaule are significantly better than non-small accounts.

The valuation of SosoValue’s Series A financing is US$200 million. In comparison, Feixiao’s valuation of US$80 million seems to be on the high side. And if the comparison between the two is still a bit far-fetched, we can take the more similar Coingecko as an example.

On January 13 this year, CoinDesk reported that Coingecko planned to sell at a valuation of $500 million. According to SimilarWeb data, the monthly visits to the Coingecko website have been around 20 million in recent months, ranking among the top 5,000 in the world, while non-small accounts are ranked outside 500,000. The difference in visits between the two may be dozens of times.

On the App Store, the number of reviews for Coingecko App is 26,000, and for non-small accounts it does not exceed 2,000. Of course, now non-small accounts cannot use domestic Apple IDs to download, and this data may ignore some early domestic users. But in any case, the traffic of non-small accounts and the traffic of Coingecko cannot be of the same magnitude, let alone the gap in brand influence.

Before 2021, the number of domestic users, influence and platform advertising effect of non-small accounts are obvious to all, but a valuation of US$80 million can still be given in 2026. The author thinks it is somewhat overestimated.

But the bulk of the overestimation does not come from these data comparisons. I will talk about the details later.

Doubt 3: Is the company’s financial situation able to afford $80 million?

笔者撰文时美股还未收盘，但联代科技的市值也仅仅只是在 500 万美元附近徘徊。

Of the US$80 million spent to acquire Feixiao, US$64 million was paid in common stock or convertible bonds. This means that Liandai Technology needs to issue additional shares that exceed 16 times its own market value just to acquire another company.

If the acquisition is completed, the company's original shareholding ratio of all shareholders will be reduced to 6%, and non-small shareholders will hold more than 90% of the shares of Liandai Technology. In other words, Liandai Technology is prepared to pay US$16 million in cash and then give control of the listed company to Feixiaohao.

As for the $16 million in cash, there are some theories, but before talking about the open source of this money, we need to first understand the financial situation of this company.

According to the financial report from March 2024 to March 2025 submitted by Liandai Technology in August 2025, the company's cash and cash equivalents as of March 31, 2025 were US$15.05 million, total assets were US$28.392 million, current liabilities were US$19.086 million, and total liabilities were US$45.991 million. Meanwhile, net losses for the same period were nearly $100 million.

It seems that Liandai Technology was unable to come up with $16 million in cash at least a year ago. "Coincidentally", on October 16, 2025, Liandai Technology signed a final securities purchase agreement with 5 institutional investors to sell a total of 22,727,275 "one Class A common stock + Class A share warrant" in a registered direct issuance, with total proceeds of approximately US$25 million.

Now it seems that this financing, for which the specific reason was not stated at the beginning, may have been prepared for today.

In addition to these, the author also found an interesting thing: According to the financial report released in August last year, no single shareholder of Liandai Technology held more than 5% of the company's shares, and the company's executives and many institutions held less than 1% of the shares. So who is behind this major decision to acquire another company at a price that exceeds 16 times the market value of the own company? Who is driving it and who is supporting it?

True or false, not a trumpet number

This is still not the whole story. Liandai Technology, which spent 16 million US dollars and gave away the company, did not clearly say "which non-small company" they bought.

In August 2024, Encrypted Intelligence revealed that many key personnel of the non-small team have been taken away by the Inner Mongolia police for investigation. Half a year has passed for unknown reasons. This news was later confirmed by Wu Shuo.

In September, Feixiaohao’s official statement stated that “the platform has recently been strategically acquired and integrated by a senior team,” emphasizing that the new team is responsible for operations and continues to provide services. But in December of the same year, Feixiaohao’s original team and the acquirer began a public war of words: the original team accused the buyer of acquiring some source code and data after paying the down payment, but refused to pay the balance, tore up the contract, and tried to resell the source code/data, which led to the original team canceling the brand sale plan and continuing to operate the platform.

The acquirer countered that it had legally registered overseas companies and trademarks, and accused the original team of delivering incomplete source code and reselling the platform. It also claimed that after taking over, it invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in repairing the system before bringing it back online.

The dispute did not have a clear outcome in the end. Two accounts, feixiaohao.com and feixiaohao.ai, also appeared on X, and it was the latter that announced the acquisition news. Based on the US-registered compliant enterprise and international logo copyright number information in the account’s introduction, the author speculates that the latter should be the buyer in the rumored acquisition in 2024.

In other words, the original Feixiao team is still operating, and Liandai Technology acquired the "New Feixiao" that had previously acquired Feixiao. The overestimation mentioned by the author in question 2 was based on the website and app of feixiaohao.com, and the .ai website is really hard to describe. If you are interested, you can check it out yourself.

This makes Liandai Technology’s operation even more incomprehensible. All the current evidence points to the fact that they spent 80 million to buy a new team and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to repair it to a version that could barely go online, without the brand equity of the original team...

And these are not even the first outrageous operations of Liandai Technology this year.

On February 3 this year, Liandai Technology announced that it had signed a strategic intention order cooperation agreement with "Shenzhen Yunwei Digital". The other party planned to purchase 500,000 smart servers and the contract amount was expected to be approximately US$50 million. Liandai Technology calls it a "high-performance server" designed to meet the growing needs of modern computing infrastructure, and said that this cooperation agreement marks the company's official entry into the field of cloud infrastructure.

Then this "high-performance server" model number "GM800" uses the RK3566 chipset, equipped with 4GB of memory and 128GB of storage space.

Like you, I don’t know what the RK3566 chip is, so I looked it up:

Can anyone tell me where buying 500,000 servers of this configuration at $100 apiece would satisfy the "growing demand for computing infrastructure"?

To sum up all the above, the only conclusion the author can draw is: Spending $80 million to acquire a non-small number should be just a game.